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Because the concept of emergence only makes sense at the light of interaction and the 
organizational form one set of elements has (a system), its powerful reemergence is 
related with the study which, in recent years, has been carried out in order to understand 
the behavior of complex systems.  
 
These systems that show a high sensitivity in the modification of their initial conditions, 
that operate far from the equilibrium, and that are characterized by their nonlinear 
relations find that as a result of their organization process, properties arise which cannot 
be identified in nor explained from the properties of their constituent elements. This is 
the tight relationship kept between the study of complex systems and the current 
resurgence of the debate regarding emergence. An increase in the complexity of a 
system, the neo-emergentists argue (Kauffman, for example, 1993, 1995), implies the 
potential emergence of properties never imaged before which add a new form of 
existence in the universe. 
 
Nevertheless this new driving force, from more than 100 years ago, continues the debate 
taking the core statement of the emergentism trend and its philosophical scope, that is, 
its capability to explain concrete complex phenomena as, for example, the arising of 
life, consciousness, intentionality, amongst others, in a non-reductive way. The 
Emergentists, contrary to their vitalist predecessors, started from a materialist base 
explanation or from what their more recent intellectual successors have called physical 
monism (Stephan, 1997, 1999, 2002). Emergentism, in general, tries to explain there are 
systemic or organizational properties (Stephan, 2002), which are not in any way related 
with the particular behavior of their constituents, either because even fully 
understanding the behavior of the primary elements it’s impossible to know the results 
their interactions produce – we call this approach epistemological emergentism or weak 
emergentism - or because the systemic properties are causally nonreducible to their 
basic constituents – we call this approach ontological or strong emergentism. 
 
At the core of the emergence discussion is the dispute between a reductive and a 
nonreductive conception of the universe, or putting it another way, between an 
ontological monism and an ontology of levels. The debate is established on two fronts; 
on one hand, between the defenders of a reductive approach and the vindicators of 
emergentism; and on the other hand, a dispute between the emergentists, those who are 
committed with a reductive perspective – micro-determinists - and those who argue in 
favor of a macro-determinism based on the notion of downward causation. That a 
reductionist raises objections against the reasons and the scope of the emergence 
program is understandable, that amongst emergentists there is no point of agreement 
raises, at the least, suspicions regarding the validity of what they are trying to elucidate.                          
 The literature surrounding the emergence concept abounds with opposing, diametrically 
opposite arguments, in which a similar example serves to support, at least two different 
points of view. In order to give support to this statement, two examples from Biology 
will be taken. Both examples refer to the arising of emergent properties. The works are:  
Emergence And Its Place In Nature: A Case Study Of Biochemical Networks, by 
Boogerd et al. (2005), and Downward Causation at the Core of Living Organization, by 
Moreno and Umerez (2000). In both cases, taking a similar problem as a point of 
departure, the result is the formulation of divergent conclusions. The next step is to 
identify their fundamental assumptions and with that try to understand their differences.   
 
I. Emergence and Its Place in Nature 
 
Boogerd et al. (2005:131), affirms that ‘the philosophical debate is largely inspired by 
metaphysical concerns’. In this way, argue the authors, ‘metaphysical conceptions of 
emergence have metaphysical goals (2005: 131)’. From this point of view, metaphysical 
emergence does not have any value for the natural sciences and there is no place for it in 
its scope of investigation. For the notion of emergent properties to have, add the 
authors, any positive role to play in a scientific setting, it must be understood 
differently. ‘It must be compatible with the thought that scientific explanations are 
mechanistic explanations (2005: 132)’. Putting it another way, emergence and reduction 
are not only compatible, but in order to offer a convincing and complete explanation of 
complex systems existing in nature, both approaches are necessary. 
 
The authors use the work of Broad – for them the most important representative of 
British emergentism in the first quarter of the last century - to propose an ontologically 
valid and empirically useful emergentism.   
 
Boogerd et al. (2005) in his work Emergence And Its Place In Nature: A Case Study Of 
Biochemical Networks argues: 
 
“We will show that there is a strong form of emergence in cell biology. Beginning with 
C.D. Broad’s classic discussion of emergence, we distinguish two conditions sufficient 
for emergence. Emergence in biology must be compatible with the thought that all 
explanations of systemic properties are mechanistic explanations and with their 
sufficiency. Explanations of systemic properties are always in terms of the properties of 
the parts within the system. Nonetheless, systemic properties can still be emergent. If 
the properties of the components within the system cannot be predicted, even in 
principle, from the behavior of the system’s parts within simpler wholes then there also 
will be systemic properties which cannot be predicted, even in principle, on basis of the 
behavior of these parts. We show in an explicit case study drawn from molecular cell 
physiology that biochemical networks display this kind of emergence, even though they 
deploy only mechanistic explanations. This illustrates emergence and its place in nature 
[2005: 131].” 
 
First of all, Boogerd et al. (2005) based on the work of Broad (1925) identifies two 
independent conditions for the emergence of properties, the first, called vertical, 
establishes that a systemic property is emergent if it is not mechanically explainable, 
even in principle, from the properties of its’ parts, its relationship within the entire 
system, the relevant laws of nature and the composition principles.          
 
In other words, what the vertical perspective establishes is the idea of unanalyzability or 
non-functionality of the emergent properties in a complex system. It does not matter if 
we know, in extreme detail, the properties of the constituent elements, the relevant laws 
of nature and the composition principles, it is not possible, even in principle, to deduce 
what kind of emergent property the system will have. This is the idea of emergence that 
appears in most metaphysical discussions, particularly in discussions about qualia. 
  
The second is the horizontal condition: A systemic property is emergent in this sense if 
the properties of the parts within the system cannot be deduced from their properties in 
isolation or in other wholes, even in principle. The properties of, say, part A in the 
context of system R (A, B, C) would be emergent in this sense if they were not 
deducible from the properties of A, B, and C in isolation or in other systems. 
 
Fulfilling the vertical condition, argues Boogerd et al. (2005), means there would be a 
failure of mechanistic explanation. The properties (and behaviors) of the system would 
then be inexplicable in terms of the properties (and behaviors) of the parts as they 
function in the system. Fulfilling the horizontal condition means the properties (and 
behaviors) of the parts within the whole cannot be predicted from their properties (and 
behaviors) in other systems. In either case the systemic properties will be emergent. The 
last condition, the horizontal, is explored in the case study about biochemical networks 
set out by Booger et al. (2005). 
 
The biochemical networks Boogerd et al. (2005) set out exhibit organizational 
properties, ones not manifested at the level of the parts, but which result from the 
interactions among the parts. Consequently, they should be explained in terms of 
component properties, which depend both on the properties of the parts and on the state 
of the entire system. Although the organizational properties encountered in 
biochemistry will always be vertically reducible, there are some cases of non-
deducibility if the deduction base is restricted appropriately. Thus, it is possible to 
present cases of emergence from a horizontal perspective, meaning, a reductive 
perspective. In other words, what the horizontal perspective affirms is that although we 
take elements participating in a complex system showing emergent properties and we 
analyze these elements in simpler systems and, finally, we identify their properties with 
extreme detail –in this case is when it is applied a reductive analysis-, is not possible 
foretell the properties this elements will exhibit at the moment of interacting within the 
system of greater complexity.    
 
The Vertical Condition, argues Boogerd et al. (2005), maintains an emergence notion of 
metaphysical character that sets metaphysical investigation objectives, for this reason 
this kind of orientation does not have a place in the natural sciences. On the other hand, 
as Boogerd et al. (2005) expresses, if an emergence concept is useful for the natural 
sciences it is because of its compatibility with explanations of mechanical character. 
The horizontal condition makes this compatibility possible. 
       
In the case study Boogerd et al. (2005) explained, from a functional point of view, how 
chemical reactions are carried out within the cell.  A cell is a semi-open metabolic 
system.  They are open insofar as they allow a free exchange of some chemicals and 
heat with the environment; however, the exchange of other substances is limited 
because they have a boundary (a membrane) separating them from their environment. 
They are systems that selectively interact with their environment by way of mass and 
energy (heat and work) exchange. The mass exchange is selective. Only certain 
chemical compounds and ions can enter or exit the cell. The exchange is often active. It 
is coupled to a chemical reaction that dissipates free energy. As long as such systems 
are driven by an external free energy source, they will display what is known as non-
equilibrium behavior. The cell as a biochemical network shows systemic properties, e.g. 
being robust to internal and external fluctuations, showing memory, displaying adaptive 
behavior. These systemic properties do not in general manifest themselves at the level 
of the parts but arise out of the interactions among the parts. They are therefore 
organizational properties. Organizational properties, therefore, are likely to be explained 
in terms of the dynamics of these interactions.  
 
The molecular biosciences teach us that all the action in biological cells is at the level of 
(macro) molecules: biological cells are physicochemical systems composed of 
interacting low-molecular weight molecules (metabolites, e.g., lactate, pyruvate), 
macromolecules (enzymes, protein complexes, DNA, mRNA) and larger structures 
thereof, all compartmentalized by semi-permeable lipid-containing membranes. Such 
systems can be looked upon as huge supra-processes composed of networks of 
interacting micro-processes. 
 
Boogerd et al. (2005) argue that one way to investigate the effects of these 
(macro)molecules is by making in silico reconstructions of biological cells, or of 
subsystems, on the basis of the (macro)molecular properties. Such models incorporate 
experimentally determined in vitro properties of (macro)molecules and, relying on that 
knowledge, reconstruct the behavior of cells. Not all properties of enzymes are 
necessary for predicting cell behavior. For emergence, the only properties that matter 
are those that refer to the interactions between the enzymes and the other 
(macro)molecular (sub)system constituents. This approach shows, using a mathematical 
model, how the sequences of chemical reactions are carried out in a biochemical 
network composed of 6 metabolites where 5 consecutive reversible reactions are 
developed, each one catalyzed by one enzyme. The result of these reactions is the 
transformation of different substrates in different products. These chain reactions 
(pathways) are important for the homeostasis, a central property of the biochemical 
networks. The resultant products of these reactions could be utilized by the cell to be 
used immediately as metabolic products or to set off other chain reactions.    
 
Boogerd et al. (2005) describe in detail how these chain reactions are carried out from 
the component properties of the enzymes. They are called “components” because they 
are determined in part by the relational properties of the components and in part by the 
state of the entire system. A component property of the enzymes depends on the 
concentration of the metabolites which communicate in the reactions and the relational 
properties of these enzymes. An explanation of these chain reactions based on the 
utilization of the component properties of the system is compatible with a mechanistic 
explanation of the subsystem in question.   
 
Nevertheless we have the most complete knowledge about components analyzed from 
simpler systems than the real biochemical systems where they develop naturally; it 
makes the behavior of these components non-deducible in more complex systems. 
Using this approach, Boogerd et al. (2005) set out that emergence in Cell Biology is 
ontologically valid and epistemologically useful, since the horizontal condition 
proposed by them is fulfilled and furthermore is compatible with a mechanical-




II. Downward Causation in the Heart of Living Organizations 
 
Moreno y Umerez (2000), argue that biological systems cannot be explained only in 
terms of physical laws, but that their organization also depends on the action of 
informational records which control the construction of the organism’s phenotypes. This 
information is shaped by natural selection through a collective and historical process. 
By controlling the lower level of molecular interactions, information acts as a kind of 
explicit formal cause which restructures matter according to a given pattern. As the 
construction of informational patterns is an open process, essentially independent of the 
dynamics of their material support, information exhibits compositional capacity which, 
besides allowing open-ended evolution, constitutes the main difference between formal 
and physical causation. 
 
Before discussing the proposal of Moreno and Umerez (2000) it is pertinent to express 
certain considerations. From a general perspective, a systemic property is emergent 
when it is nonreducible to the properties of its constituent elements, and it is 
nonreducible because this property, which belongs to a micro-level, can causally inflict 
changes in the micro-structure of the system from which the property has emerged. It is 
known as downward causation and is the core component of a nonreductive approach 
regarding the concept of emergence. It can be said that an emergent property is real and 
not a mere epiphenomena when it has causal powers. Downward causation thesis can 
not be eluded if we want to concede an ontological status to these emergent properties.     
 
Moreno and Umerez (2000) are intellectually committed with a nonreductive 
perspective regarding the notion of emergent properties in biological systems. They 
establish as a reference framework the assertion made by Campbell (1974, 1990) about 
downward causation:    
 
‘Where natural selection operates through life and death at a higher level of 
organization, the laws of the higher level selective system determine in part the 
distribution of lower level events and substances. Description of an intermediate-
level phenomenon is not completed by describing its possibility and 
implementation in lower level terms. Its presence, prevalence, or distribution (all 
needed for the complete explanation of biological phenomena) will often require 
reference to laws at a higher level of organization as well. […] all processes at 
the lower levels of a hierarchy are restrained by, and act in conformity to, the 
laws of the higher levels [1990: 4]’. 
 
The notion of downward causation drives us to conceive a universe constituted of 
different organizational levels, ontologically real; a hierarchical universe, ascertain 
Moreno y Umerez. In a biological system some components will not be able to be 
partitioned into disjointed sets. Most of the complex biological molecules are not found 
in other organized components that are not living organisms, and it is easy to test how 
quickly proteins decay out of the cell. When we try to understand why such components 
exist within cells, we find that a complex web of chemical interactions continuously 
generates, maintains and replaces them. Accordingly, biological components appear 
integrated in a complex organization. On the other hand, all of these molecular 
components do not belong to the same (unique) level, but they are organized 
hierarchically. 
 
Moreno y Umerez (2000) propose a wider and plural vision regarding what causality is, 
in which prevails the materialistic principle, and overcome the principle of explanatory 
exclusivity, i.e. multiple causes, acting jointly, can produce a unique phenomena. They 
affirm biological systems cannot be explained unless we take into account, in addition 
to physical causality, internally generated constraints. Biological organisms generate 
and result from a certain kind of boundary condition which selectively constrains those 
dynamical processes which constitute their identity. This type of causal action is 
“formal” in the sense that it infuses forms, i.e., it materially restructures matter 
according to a form. Moreno and Umerez (2000) give a different meaning to the notion 
of formal causality utilized in the Aristotelian  philosophy. In Aristotle, both formal and 
material causes are intrinsic, whereas efficient and final ones are extrinsic. From 
Moreno and Umerez (2000)’s view of formal cause, being efficient and being intrinsic 
do not exclude each other. In a sense, formal cause is intrinsic inasmuch as it is 
inherently generated in the very system which becomes an autonomous complex 
system.          
 
A formal cause acts materially in the sense that formal causality implies the requirement 
of complex and specific aggregates of matter and specific and controlled flows of 
energy. And this restructuring of matter is not an implicit process, but the consequence 
of a given pattern (whose domain of possible structures is autonomous from dynamical 
considerations) which brings forth and stabilizes possible —but improbable— complex 
organizations of matter (i.e. proteins, cells, pluricellular organizations, etc.). The basic 
type of formal causation in biological systems is genetic information, which consists in 
a complementary and recursive interaction between certain records (which are the result 
of previous processes of organization that shape some conservative molecular 
components) and a set of components in the individual systems that are restructured 
depending on the causal activity of such records 
 
Accordingly, formal causation is a quite different kind of causality than physical 
causality. Physical (or “material”) causality lies on the intrinsic activity of matter, 
whose processes occurs in intrinsic time and energy, and do not require underlying 
levels of organization. On the contrary, formal causality needs underlying levels of 
material organization (enormous amount of systems and time) and consists in explicit 
re-arrangements of matter (in fact, it is an autonomous over-determination of matter in 
formal terms) and, at the causal level, processes occur at arbitrary times and costs of 
energy. Hence, the idea of formal causality advocated here differs from physical 
causality in its matter re-arranging and non-intrinsic character. It is therefore important 
to emphasize that these causal explanations of a type beyond the mechanical efficient 
are as legitimate as this one. 
 
In biological terms the relationship between the level of molecular interactions in a cell 
and the global level of the cell as a whole, can not be fully understood unless we 
consider it embedded in a collective and historical dimension. The organization of the 
cell is a highly complex web of chemical reactions. In this organization many classes of 
components take part, but the extreme precision of this organization relies on the fact 
that practically all of the biological reactions are controlled by one type of molecule: 
enzymatic proteins. If we inquire about the “agent” that produces a given protein (in 
Aristotelian terms, the efficient cause of this particular protein), the answer would be 
that the material causes are the amino acids. Concretely, the synthesis of any protein is a 
direct consequence of the action of tRNAs and peptidyltransferases protein molecules, 
both involved in the formation of the string of amino acids. Therefore (in Aristotelian 
terms) amino acids would be considered to be the material cause of the proteins. As 
Aristotle himself admitted, these different causes may act together. 
  
But proteins are highly specific and complex. This complexity is manifested in their 
three-dimensional structure, which results from the folding of a specific one-
dimensional string of about one hundred small molecules (amino acids). As the proteins 
are constituted of 20 different aminoacids, and the average length of a protein is about 
one hundred, there is an incredibly high number of possible proteins (about 20100). 
Given that in the cellular organization enzymatic functions are highly specific, one 
fundamental problem is to determine which are the causal mechanisms for explaining 
the synthesis of every specific protein in a given cell. The answer to this question at an 
individual cell level is that the specific sequence of amino acids that constitute the 
proteins of this particular organism, are ultimately related to the specific sequence of the 
nucleotides of DNA molecules. DNA (and RNA) acts, then, as an "in-formational" 
template for the synthesis of proteins, because such templates contain the necessary 
instructions for guiding or regulating the production of proteins. 
 
Hence, in Aristotelian terms, DNA molecules are the formal cause of proteins in 
biological cells, because their specific sequence of nucleotides conveys the "idea" or 
"form" of the latter. In fact, the causal role that DNA plays in the synthesis of proteins 
is, in addition, in-formative in an explicit sense because it is possible to establish 
explicit mappings between the sequence of DNA and the primary structure of those 
proteins whose construction is driven by it. 
 
On the other hand, as Moreno and Umerez (2000) specify, a codifier is necessary which 
joins the nucleotides sequence to the amino acid sequence. This translation process 
requires a complex number of steps in which some of the same proteins are involved. 
To sum up, the components that build a system as a “whole” are generated at the same 
time through a network of interactions from the entire system. To consider the complete 
chain as a result of an essential level made by the simplest components which their own 
properties define their interactions, would be partial. The reason for this is that many of 
these components may only exist as a consequence of the recursive maintenance of the 
entire network. Examples of models that explain these kinds of systems are those 
presented by Kauffman (1991): the autocatalytic co-jointed model and Fontana (1992): 
Algorithmic Chemistry. What these models present is the appearance of functional or 
operationally closed systems, which are necessary in order to understand the origin of 
biological systems. But, it is another condition, the genetic information which makes 
speaking appropriately about the appearance of new types of chance relationships 
possible: the formal causality through records. Thus, what it allows to assume a double 
chance action in the biological systems – an ascending or mechanic and another 
descending – is the conjunction of a circular causality with different levels of 
organization; one of these is constituted by informative components.   
 
Moreno and Umerez (2000) support that the biological organization is more than mere 
networks of recursive individual reactions. One of its main characteristics is to evolve 
by natural selection. The DNA represents the material connection between a collective 
and historical dimension and the individual organization.  The specific patterns that a 
given DNA molecule possesses have been formed through selective mechanisms which 
require a collective spatial and a temporary dimension. Due to this fact, the informative 
role of the DNA in the cellular organization is qualitatively different from the functional 
activity of all the rest of the cell components. A living organization requires a meta-
network where the individual networks constitute a structure of synchronic 
(competition) and diachronic (character transmission through reproduction) 
relationships. For this reason, neither the auto-organization nor the generated 
information through natural selection, are enough themselves to explain the living 
organization; its action as a whole is necessary.   
 
The information shows compositional capacities due to the construction of information 
patterns is an open process. This compositional capacity, besides allowing an open and 
endless evolution process, it constitutes the main difference between formal and 
physical causality. In functional terms, the chance action of the information permits on 
one hand, the auto-maintenance process in the first living systems had been solid and on 
the other hand, an increase in its complexity. The records, formed by a collective and 
autonomous process, materially realign material subsets of structures by means of 
which highly organized systems, with major complexity levels than previous systems, 
are generated. 
In these terms, Moreno and Umerez (2000) support that the descending causality, in 
biological systems, has at least two significances with respect to the living organization: 
 
1) On the level of each particular organism, the informative components (DNA 
molecules) restrict the chemical reactions of a minor level which constitute 
the cell. 
2) Considering life as a collective and historical phenomenon, individuals are 
the result of this collectively and historically generated information.  
 
The authors conclude that the biological system can not be explained unless it is 
considered that its organization generates and at the same time, is the result of, its 
internal limit conditions. Such limit conditions, autonomously generated from natural 
selection, selectively restrict the dynamic process of organisms and thus, connect the 
physical and chemical laws. This process in biology is usually described in a language 
on which DNA molecules play a opportunistic role. Due to the fact that biology can 
identify the material structures involved in these processes and can understand each of 
their steps, many biologists tend to consider that such descriptions are a successful 
explanation of the living organization in physical terms. Finally, Moreno y Umerez 
support that the descending causality appears when meta-networks of extremely 
complex and interconnected recursive reactions emerge in nature.  It is not a surprise to 
understand that this strange co-joined group of auto-descriptor molecular systems 
requires something more than standard physical explanations.  
 
III. Emergence: Between reductive and non-reductive explanations 
    
The mechanistic perspective 
After presenting on one hand the works of Boogerd et al. (2005), and on the other hand 
the Works of Moreno and Umerez (2000), it is time to analyze both points of view with 
respect to the notion of emergence. In the first instance, the point at which both postures 
diverge will be presented and in a second instance, the author’s particular evaluation in 
the current work will be shown.  
 
Three elements deserve special attention in the work of Boogerd et al. (2005): his notion 
of the cell, the type of operating causality in the biochemical networks of the cell and 
the type of reductionism that supposes his approach.   
 
According to them, one cell is a metabolic semi-open system which selectively 
exchanges some chemical substances, mass, heat and work (energy) with the 
environment and that in this complex framework of interactions it presents systematic 
properties such as: the stability before internal or external fluctuations, organizational 
memory and the deployment of an adaptive behavior. All of them are properties which 
do not show themselves at the level of individual cell components. The cell is a unit of 
autonomous, auto-sustainable processing and it can auto-replicate itself. It is a 
thermodynamic machinery far from the equilibrium, this means, using the Prigogine 
language, a dissipative structure.  
“A biological system, which metabolizes and reproduces, must effectively 
exchange energy and mass with the environment; therefore, it functions as 
an open system. On the other hand, the maintenance of life and growth 
depend on an infinite number of chemical reactions and transport 
phenomena, which their control implies the intervention of non-lineal 
factors (activation, inhibition, direct auto-catalization, etc.) Finally, the 
energy contribution is generally made under unstable conditions because the 
reaction products are expelled from the living system or sent to other places 
of the cell so they can perform other functions. In brief: the functioning of 
the biological systems seems to accomplish the necessary conditions so the 
dissipative structures can appear.” [1997: 316). 
The cell, from the point of view of Boogerd et al. (2005), is a system that can be 
decomposed into subsets of minor complexity in order to analyze the behavior of its 
constituent elements and to understand the processes that are made in the biochemical 
networks. This means, to understand, for example, how the synthesis of proteins, the 
replication process of DNA or the transformation of substrates in products through the 
chemical reactions catalyzed by enzymes, are made. Above all, the cell is a functional 
unity. From this functionalist point of view, if we ask ourselves what is that which 
causes the regulation process called homeostasis in the biochemical networks, we would 
respond that it is a chain of events that may begin from a change of temperature or 
pressure at a level of the organism and that it translates itself into feedback processes 
which involve a cellular machinery. But, another way to respond is focusing the answer 
on the chemical control that is made in the cells. When we speak about the chemical 
control, we speak about the activity that receivers and messengers (hormones) perform; 
the receivers are glycoproteins which join to specific messengers. This connection 
produces the events that lead to an answer from the cell.  The combination of the 
receivers with the messengers produces a change in the same receivers, this event is 
called receivers activation. This can lead to changes in the permeability or the electrical 
state of the cell membrane, in the cell metabolism, in the secretory activity of the cell, in 
the proliferation or differentiation of the cell or in its contractive activity. Chain 
reactions (pathways) of transduction signals are the name for the mechanisms by which 
the activation of a receiver leads to a final response of a cell. These chain reactions are 
those that Boogerd et al. (2005) describes in detail in his work.  These chain reactions 
stop when the concentration of the first messenger diminishes due to its metabolism and 
diffusion. The receivers are chemically altered, diminishing their affinity with the first 
Messenger (hormone) or are removed when the receiver-messenger complex is carried 
to the inside of the cell by endocytosis. 
 
In this functionalistic description, on the one hand, the notion of efficient causality plays 
a preponderant role. Efficient causality, in this sense, refers to the principles of 
production, creation or modification that happen in the constituent elements of the cell. 
On the other hand, material causality is that on which certain transformations operate, in 
this case, the cellular elements.  In the causal explanation of the systemic properties, 
provided by Boogerd et al. (2005), which claims to describe the function of every 
element in order to, finally, describe the function of the entire system. This is a 
mechanistic approach. 
 
But, what is a mechanism? A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue 
of its components parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated 
functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena (Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 2005). To say that a causal relationship is bottom-up or top-down is to say 
that things at one level are causally related to things at another level. The term ‘level’ 
plays many roles in science (Bechtel, 2006). There are levels of abstraction, being, 
causation, description, explanation, function, and generality, to name a few, and these 
are not the same. For each, there is a different sense in which a cause can be said to be 
at the top (or bottom) and a different sense in which its influence is propagated 
downward (or upward).  
 
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they exhibit a phenomenon. 
Scientists discover lower levels by decomposing the behavior of a mechanism into the 
behaviors of its component parts, decomposing the behaviors of the parts into the 
behaviors of their parts, and so on. Because mechanisms are organized collections of 
components and their activities, no component can be larger than the mechanism as a 
whole, and so levels of mechanisms are ordered by size. For analogous reasons, higher-
level behaviors act over longer time-periods than lower-level activities. 
 
Most fundamentally, levels of mechanisms are a species of compositional, or part-
whole, relationships. In contemporary debates about reduction and inter-level causation, 
it is common for authors to talk about ‘levels of aggregation,’ ‘levels of organization,’ 
‘levels of complexity,’ and ‘mereological levels.’ Such descriptions also apply to levels 
of mechanisms. Higher levels of mechanisms are aggregated (i.e., built up from) or 
composed from parts that are organized into more complex spatial, temporal, and causal 
relationships. 
 
This compositional argument is what Boogerd et al. (2005) developed with their essay. 
It is a reductive argument because it is structured in terms of a mechanistic explanation 
which, at the same time, is useful for natural science and, in addition, takes into account 
the organizational dimension of living systems. The compositional argument set the 
limit for any kind of reductive approach and the limits are the very interacting elements 
being analyzed by an observer, an observer who outlines the framework of reference; it 
cannot be otherwise.  
  
This kind of functional analysis is similar to what Mayr (1997) called proximate causes 
analysis in Biology. As Mayr (1997) clearly described, the functional biologist (the 
observer) is vitally concerned with the operation and interaction of structural elements, 
from molecules, to organs and up to whole individuals. His ever-repeated question is 
"How?" How does something operate? How does it function? The functional anatomist 
who studies an articulation shares this method and approach with the molecular 
biologist who studies the function of a DNA molecule in the transfer of genetic 
information. The functional biologist attempts to isolate the particular component he 
studies, and in any given study he usually deals with a single individual, a single organ, 
a single cell, or a single part of a cell. He attempts to eliminate, or control, all variables, 
and he repeats his experiments under constant or varying conditions until he believes he 
has clarified the function of the element he studies. Proximate causes is used to answer 
the question of how. They affect the phenotype, meaning, the morphology and behavior 
of living systems, and they are, most of the time, mechanics. Proximate causes occur 
here and now, in a specific phase of the cell cycle and experimentation helps to 
determine these causal relations. A useful account of emergence in terms of a 
mechanistic framework is what Boogerd et al. (2005) has done for the natural sciences 
in an outstanding way. 
 
 
The Antireductive Perspective 
 
It is important to establish the importance that the concepts of cell information and 
downward causation have in the works of Moreno and Umerez (2000). Contrary to 
Boogerd et al. (2005), Moreno and Umerez (2000) define a cell not only as a 
physicochemical system composed of interacting low-molecular weight molecules 
(metabolites, e.g., lactate, pyruvate), macromolecules (enzymes, protein complexes, 
DNA,mRNA) and larger structures thereof, all compartmentalized by semipermeable 
lipid-containing membranes; a cell, in addition, is the historical and collective 
dimension of a living organization. 
 
Evolving organizations possess components able to act as records which transfer a set of 
patterns generated in a collective frame to the individual cells. These patterns are, in 
turn, autonomously interpreted as specifications or instructions by every individual cell. 
Once expressed, selective pressures discard many of these embodied patterns. The 
transmission of these historically generated patterns requires a kind of molecule suitable 
for (self)replication, storage and transmission of patterns, along with the capability to 
permit  —and transmit— some local changes without altering its remaining functions. 
DNA is the most suitable kind of biomolecule which establishes a causal link between 
historical-collective processes and individual organizations. 
 
As it was mentioned, DNA represents the material connection between the 
collective/historical dimension and the individual organization. The specific pattern that 
a given DNA molecule possesses (whatever its causal effects might be in the cell that 
expresses it) has been shaped through selective mechanisms that require a spatial and 
temporal collective dimension. This is why the informational role of DNA in the 
cellular organization is qualitatively different from the functional activity of all the other 
components of the cell. 
 
There is a "bootstrapping" type of process between the setting up of the individuals and 
the collective network where ultimately the information is generated, because the 
interpretation of this information occurs in each individual organism and constitutes it. 
This long-term collectively generated sequence of specifications is what, at the 
individual level, acts as in-formation, constraining the underlying dynamics of the 
chemical processes in every organism in a top-down way. 
 
As information lies in non-dynamical and relatively stable material structures, whose 
changes are independent of rate and energy (at the individual organizational level), the 
informational domain is only contingently related to the domain of the dynamic 
organization where it is expressed. Then, information shows compositional capacity 
because the construction of informational patterns is an open process. This 
compositional capacity, in addition to allowing open-ended evolution, constitutes the 
main difference between formal (informational) and physical causation. In functional 
terms, the causal action of information allows, on the one hand, the robustness of the 
processes of self maintenance in early living systems and, on the other hand, the 
increase of their complexity. The informational components (records), shaped through a 
collective and historical process, materially rearrange material subsets of structures so 
that highly organized systems, with levels of complexity higher than previous systems, 
are generated. 
 
In causal terms, Moreno and Umerez (2000) state, the basic type of formal causation in 
biological systems is genetic information, which consists of a complementary and 
recursive interaction between certain records (which are the result of previous processes 
of organization that shape some conservative molecular components) and a set of 
components in the individual systems that are restructured depending on the causal 
activity of such records. Accordingly, formal causation is a quite different kind of 
causality than physical causality. Physical (or “material”) causality lies on the intrinsic 
activity of matter, whose processes occurs in intrinsic time and energy, and does not 
require underlying levels of organization. On the contrary, formal causality needs 
underlying levels of material organization (enormous amounts of systems and time) and 
consists in explicit re-arrangements of matter (in fact, it is an autonomous over-
determination of matter in formal terms) and, at the causal level, processes occur at 
arbitrary times and costs of energy. Hence, the idea of formal causality advocated by 
Moreno and Umerez (2000) differs from physical causality in its matter re-arranging 
and non-intrinsic character. 
 
It is therefore important, Moreno and Umerez (2000) explain: 
 
“[…] to emphasize that causal explanations of a kind beyond the mechanical 
efficient are as legitimate as this one, insofar as materially and scientifically 
sound connections are provided. In this sense there seems to be no reason to 
accept an a priori contradiction between emergence and causality, unless we had 
good reasons to prefer a narrower conception of causality which we certainly find 
difficult to come with when dealing with the complex objects of study on which 
science is focusing nowadays (not only in biology but in general in non-linear 
physics, not to mention psychological or sociological domains)” [2000:103].             
 
Coming back again to Mayr (1997)’s work, what Moreno and Umerez (2000) are 
talking about is evolutionary biology.  The evolutionary biologist differs in his method 
and in the problems in which he is interested. His basic question is "Why?" “Why” 
means "How come?" but it may also mean the finalistic "What for?" When the 
evolutionist asks "Why?" he or she always has in mind the historical "How come?" 
Every organism, as an individual and as a member of a species, is the product of a long 
history, a history which indeed dates back more than 3,000 million years. Everything is 
time-bound and space-bound. The animal or plant or micro-organism he is working with 
is but a link in an evolutionary chain of changing forms, none of which has any 
permanent validity." There is hardly any structure or function in an organism that can be 
fully understood unless it is studied against this historical background. And it is on this 
historical background where the reductive arguments lose its useful explaining power. 
A cell as a historical unit and specifically the DNA as an informational unit, in terms of 




The Debate: between reductive and nonreductive explanations. 
 
The concept of a cell as a functional unit against the perspective of the cell as an 
historical unit; efficient and material causality against causal plurality, with special 
emphasis on formal causality; a mechanistic approach (micro-determinist) against an 
organistic approach (macro-determinist); the defense of an ontological emergentism 
from the dissertation of non - deducibility, against the defense of an ontological 
emergentism based on the dissertation of irreducibility. In short, these are the most 
notable differences between the works of Boogerd et al. (2005) and Moreno and 
Umerez (2000), works that, from these opposing perspectives, try to positively argue the 
validity of the assertion of the existence of emergent properties in the universe. 
 
The conclusions of the present essay are: 
a) If one tries to give consistency to the emergence notion in its strongest 
(ontological) sense, one has to do so from the defense of the irreducibility 
thesis and, consequently, of downward causation, both components of a 
macro-determinist position. Another option is that of sustaining an 
emergentism based on non-deterministic principles, which will not be 
explored in the present essay. 
b) If the correct way to raise an ontological emergentism is to do so with the 
study of irreducibility and downward causation, the work of Boogerd et al. 
(2005) did not obtain the objective, but the work of Moreno and Umerez 
(2000) did. 
c) Emergent properties may or may not exist (ontologically), but what is argued 
in the current work is that the most useful way of defining it is in terms of the 
irreducibility thesis and downward causation. Ontological micro-determinist 
emergentism is an absurdity 
 
As a continuation the following arguments are presented: 
Broad’s work The Mind and its Place in Nature is the basis for the Boogerd et al. 
(2005) essay. In his outstanding work, Broad focuses the emergence concept 
explanation on the thesis of nondeducibility. Stephan (1992, 39), taking this proposal 
into account, articulated a definition of emergence on the basis of nondeducibility as 
follow: 
 
A system property P (of system S) is called emergentabsolute if 
a) there is a law PL which holds: for all x when x has the microstructure [C1, 
…,Cn; O] then x has property P. 
b) for all microstructures [y1, …, y1;w] of system S: if there is law PL* which 
holds: for all x when x has a microstructure [y1, …, y1;w] then x has property P, 
there is no theory T and there are no laws concerning the y1, …, y1 in isolation or 
in other microstructures, even together with compositional principles, from which 
could be PL* deduced. [Stephan, 1992: 39] 
 
The problem with this approach is its emphasis on laws and the nondeducibility of laws 
from a theory T, specifically fundamental laws, but this is an epistemological concern, 
not an ontological one. As Schroder (1998) mentioned, a property is emergent as long 
as either we do not have the right theories about the properties of the parts or we have 
the right theories but not the computational power to deal with the increasing 
complexity as we move from H-atoms to economies. Additionally, in Biology there are 
no laws. If there are not any laws, there is no scope for ontological emergence in 
Broad’s characterization of this concept and, furthermore, there is no scope for 
reduction at all. 
 
The absence of laws in biology reflects some fundamental and ineliminable facts about 
the biological realm and the scientific study of that realm. To begin with, individuation 
of types in biology is almost always via a causal role, and in particular via a function. 
For instance, to call something a wing, or a fin, or a gene is to identify it in terms of its 
function. But biological functions are naturally-selected effects. And natural selection 
for adaptations –i.e. environmentally appropriate effects- is blind to differences in 
physical structure that have the same or roughly similar effects. 
 
Following Rosenberg (2001), it is the nature of any mechanism that selects for effects 
that it cannot discriminate between differing structures with identical effects. And 
functional equivalence combined with structural difference will always increase as 
physical combinations become larger and more physically differentiated from one 
another. Moreover, perfect functional equivalence is not necessary. Mere functional 
similarity will do. Since selection for function is blind to differences in structure, there 
will be no laws in any science which, like biology, individuates kinds by selected 
effects, that is, by functions. A law in functional biology will have to link a functional 
kind either with another functional kind, for example, “all butterfly wings have 
eyespots” or a structural kind, “all eyespots are composed of proteins”. But neither of 
these statements can be a strict law, because of the blindness of natural selection (which 
forms functional kinds) to structure (which will therefore heterogeneously realize 
functional kinds). 
 
The upshot is not simply that there are no laws; ergo neither reductionism nor 
antireductionism about laws is tenable in biology. The entire character of biology as a 
discipline reflects the considerations which make laws impossible. Functional kinds 
have etiologies that reflect natural selection operating on local conditions, and natural 
selection is constantly changing local conditions. This makes biology an essentially 
historical discipline. 
 
Beyond the bare theory of natural selection itself, the rest of biology is a set of 
subdisciplines historically conditioned by the operation of natural selection on local 
circumstances during the history of the Earth. The functional individuation of biological 
kinds reflects the vagaries and vicissitudes of natural selection, since biological kinds 
are the result of selection over variation in order to solve design problems set by the 
environment. Possible solutions to the same problem are multiple and one biological 
system’s solution sets a competing biological system’s next design problem. Therefore, 
each system’s environment varies over time in a way that makes all putative biological 
“generalizations” about these systems historically limited descriptions of local patterns. 
Any subdiscipline of biology--from paleontology to developmental biology, to 
population biology, to physiology or molecular biology can uncover, at best, historically 
conditioned patterns, owing to the fact that a) its kind vocabulary picks out items 
generated by an historical process, and b) its “generalizations” will always be overtaken 
by evolutionary events. Some of these “generalizations” will describe long-term and 
wide spread historical patterns, such as the ubiquity of nucleic acid as the hereditary 
material; others will be local and transitory. 
 
But if the thesis of nondeducibility does not explain what emergence is in Biology, then 
the next step is to analyze if irreducibility thesis can do it. The intuition of emergence is 
that of novel causal powers coming into being at specific levels of ontology (Bickhard, 
2000). If causal powers do emerge, then, within the framework of any reasonable 
naturalism, any causal consequences of those higher level emergent powers will 
themselves involve constituent levels of matter, or at least constituent levels of 
organizations of quantum processes. That is, any consequences of emergent causality 
will affect lower levels, constituent levels, of pattern and organization as well as the 
level at which the emergence occurs. More concisely, causal emergence implies 
downward causation. Since interesting emergence involves causal emergence, and 
causal emergence implies downward causation, downward causation becomes a strong 
criterion for genuine causal emergence and, more generally, for interesting emergence. 
If a notion of emergence is tenable it is because irreducibility thesis is at the core of the 
concept. If an emergent property is not causally effective in the universe then it does not 
have any causal powers at all. 
           
The work of Moreno and Umerez (2000) follows a nonreductive approach. They 
establish the operation of a formal causality independent of a material causality. This 
formal causality, informational causality, basically is responsible for the organization of 
the system. This kind of causality operates in a downward direction. Moreno and 
Umerez (2000) explain it as follow: 
 
“[…] information shows compositional capacity because the construction of 
informational patterns is an open process, essentially independent of the 
dynamics of their material support. This compositional capacity, in addition to 
allow open-ended evolution, constitutes the main difference between formal 
(informational) and physical causation. In functional terms, the causal action of 
information allows, on the one hand, the robustness of the processes of self 
maintenance in the early living systems and, on the other, the increase of their 
complexity. The informational components (records), shaped through a collective 
and historical process, materially rearrange material subsets of structures so that 
highly organized systems, with levels of complexity higher than previous 
systems, are generated. 
Accordingly, this idea of formal causation is functionally similar to the one 
expressed by Campbell […], when he defended the idea of Downward Causation 
as (the action of) the laws of the higher level selectively determining in part the 
“presence, prevalence, or distribution” of lower level events and substances. 
However, this top-down action (downward causation) has at least two 
complementary meanings in the living organization: 
 
1) at the level of each particular organism, the informational components (DNA 
molecules) constrain the lower level chemical reactions that constitute the cell. 
2) considering life as a collective and historical phenomenon, the individuals are 
the result of this collectively generated historical information. 
 
At its turn, the shaping of this information is only possible as a consequence of a 
selective process, consisting in a functional evaluation of the new forms at the 
level of the phenotypes. Ultimately, the selection process that shapes the 
information results from the viability or reproductive capacities of the 
phenotypes” [2000:115]. 
 
The strong concept of downward causation is typically explained in terms of material or 
physical causality, but this is not the case with Moreno’s and Umerez’s (2000) proposal. 
They appeal for a weaker version of downward causation, in fact, a medium downward 
causation. Using the work of Emmeche et al. (2000), the kind of downward causation 
expressed in the essay by Moreno and Umerez (2000) can be described as follows: 
 
“The distinctive feature of medium DC in contrast to strong DC is that it does not 
allow higher level phenomena to have a direct influence on lower level laws.  
Medium downward causation can be defined as follows: an entity on a higher 
level comes into being through a realization of one amongst several possible 
states on the lower level –with the previous states of the higher level as the factor 
of selection. This idea can be made more precise with the aid of an interpretation 
of the concept of "boundary condition."  
In relation to level theories, boundary conditions are conceived as the conditions 
which select and delimit various types of the system's several possible 
developments. The realization of the system implies that one of these typical 
developments is selected, and the set of initial conditions yielding the type of 
possibility chosen are thus a certain type of boundary condition which has been 
called constraining conditions. They only exist in complex multi-level 
phenomena on a level higher than the focal level, and are the conditions by which 
entities on a high level constrain the activity on the lower focal level. 
On this basis, medium downward causation can be reformulated as follows: 
higher level entities are constraining conditions for the emergent activity of 
lower levels” [Emmeche et al., 2000: 19-26]. 
 
Moreno and Umerez (2000) avoid the stronger concept of downward causation and the 
logical implications that it carries. Instead, they focus their attention on the potential 
that information has to explain the process of organization in a biological system and 
how the system as a whole is organized by itself. These patterns of organization are 
ontological levels of existence, as real as their material constituents. 
 
If using the downward causation notion as the last word and unquestionable argument in 
favor of emergence and the thesis of nonreducibility is the most adequate alternative, or 
not, is something that cannot be solved yet. But what is defended in this work is the 
following: If we want to make sense of the emergence concept, this must add new light 
to the problem we are elucidating, and it is necessary to accurately establish what that 
problem is. Emergence notion arises as a theoretical alternative against the 
reductionistic and mechanical explanations regarding the phenomenon of life. Finally if 
life can be explained in terms of a mechanistic approach it is no longer necessary to talk 
about emergence. It will be argued in historical terms. 
 
The concept of emergence was, according to C. Lloyd Morgan (1923), coined by G. H. 
Lewes in his Problems of Life and Mind in 1875. Morgan specifies that similar concepts 
are to be found in the theories of J. S. Mill and the psychologist W.Wundt.  
 
It is no pure accident that the concept was in frequent use at the beginning of the 20th 
century. In most of the more recent discussions on the concept of emergence, it is 
opposed to those of reductionism, determinism and/or mechanistic materialism. But 
before the concept of emergence was coined, reductionism and mechanism were most 
often discussed in connection with another concept. This discussion partner was 
vitalism. 
 
Historically conceived, when vitalism was discarded as an unusable concept, a new 
concept was coined, preserving some of the vitalistic viewpoints; this concept was 
emergence. The concept of emergence consists of those reasonable aspects of vitalism 
which are worth maintaining. The classical vitalist doctrines from the 18th century insist 
upon the idea that all life phenomena are animated by immaterial life spirits. These life 
spirits determine the various life phenomena, but are in themselves unexplainable and 
undescribable from a physical point of view. In opposition to this, the reductionist 
position (in the 18th century) insists upon a large part, if not all, of life phenomena 
being reducible to physics and chemistry.  
 
The difference between vitalism and reductionism was continuously transformed. After 
a number of scientific discoveries at the beginning of the 19th century the vitalists did 
not give up, but they gradually limited their viewpoints to a narrower field. 
Reductionism now claimed, on the other hand, that every phenomenon in the whole 
world, including the highest psychological ones, were reducible to physics and 
chemistry. 
 
Relating these differences between vitalism and reductionism to the concept of 
emergence, the concept is obviously primarily vitalistic – but it also transforms vitalism, 
or at least restricts it in a very important aspect. Emergence is first of all defined as “the 
creation of new properties”. It is very important to distinguish between the vitalists and 
the emergentists: the vitalist’s creative forces were relevant only in organic substances, 
not in inorganic matter. Emergence hence is a creation of new properties regardless of 
the substance involved. 
 
There is one central problem which Morgan does not specify in his definition of 
emergence – the question of levels. The question of levels is always more or less 
implicitly discussed, and its explicit discussion is one of the modern aspects of the 
concept. But levels were also discussed in the 19th century, especially in relation to 
evolution. The vitalistic ideas are generally discussed as if they only applied to the 
biological theory of evolution. However, in the 19th century the theory of evolution was 
a much larger field than it became after neo-Darwinism – as is evident in the general 
historicism of the epoch covering most scientific works except those of physics and 
chemistry.  
 
The thought of the system builders is another historical fact which is not very often 
related to the development of vitalism and theories of emergence. But these system 
builders’ discussions are very important, and they are one of the main reasons that the 
concept of emergence was “devitalized”, that is, deprived of an immaterial causal agent. 
Among the main system builders in the 19th century were Auguste Comte (1798–1857), 
Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), Ernst Hackel (1834– 
1919), and Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914). The name “system builders” refers to the 
fact that they all created theories which analyze the relationship between a scientific 
description of the total world and the different scientific disciplines – two systems were 
related, the system of sciences and the system of the objects of the different sciences (in 
total = the world).  
 
The emergence concept merely denotes the creation of new entities (properties) which 
cannot be derived from preceding conditions. And this is precisely what the great 
potentiality of the concept is. Emergence is, among other things, the concept which 
relates levels to each other – or to be more precise, the concept which denotes the very 
passage between them. Contrary to what Boogerd et al. (2005) say, emergence does not 
in itself solve anything, but it poses the problem in a general way, making it visible at 
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